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Abstract 
The central and autonomic nervous systems are defined by anatomical, functional and 
neurochemical characteristics but neither functions in isolation. Fundamental components of 
autonomically mediated homeostatic processes are afferent interoceptive signals reporting 
the internal state of the body and efferent signals acting on interoceptive feedback assimilated 
by the brain. Recent predictive coding (interoceptive inference) models formulate interoception 
in probabilistic inference terms to explain mechanisms supporting emotion and selfhood. We 
propose interoception may serve as a way to investigate holistic nervous system function and 
dysfunction in disorders of brain, body and behaviour. Here, we apply a formal predictive 
coding framework  grounded in the free-energy principle, to describe homeostatic functions of 
the central and autonomic nervous systems that are bound by interoceptive processes. We 
do so by (i)  firstly describing the application of predictive coding – as circumscribed within the 
active inference framework – to homeostasis via symbiotic interoceptive and autonomic 
function, before (ii) secondly describing clinical applications of this framework. Finally, we (iii) 
describe how this offers an overarching approach to human physiology, particularly 
autonomically mediated systems, thereby offering a new means to investigate the interaction 
of the central and peripheral nervous systems in health and disease.   
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1. Introduction 
‘Interoception’ refers to afferent sensory information arising from the viscera that underwrites 
homeostatic functioning (1). The control of interoceptive stability or homeostasis (i.e., 
autonomic nervous system regulation) can be mapped onto a hierarchical organisation; 
ranging from basic physiological reflexes to global cortical networks that integrate the function 
of the central and autonomic nervous systems (2-5). Fundamental components of these 
homeostatic processes are afferent interoceptive signals reporting the internal state of the 
body and efferent signals acting on interoceptive feedback (4, 6-8), in the form of homeostatic 
reflexes that are informed by somatic states represented in the central nervous system. Co-
ordinated central and peripheral nervous system function is required, even at lower tiers in the 
hierarchy, where structures such as the spinal cord, brainstem and hypothalamus mediate 
autonomic outflows and descending cortical inhibition (9, 10). For example, the periaqueductal 
gray (PAG), which regulates input/output of nociceptive and visceral signals, is also innervated 
by descending anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) projections, which can boost or inhibit pain 
responsivity, selectively (9). Moreover, chemoreceptors in the brain stem monitor arterial 
carbon dioxide, oxygen and hydrogen ion levels to regulate carbon dioxide, oxygen and pH 
perfusion via sympathetic and phrenic efferents. More generally, hypothalamic, pontine and 
medullary sympathetic and parasympathetic nuclei interact with homeostatic representations 
to generate effector-organ specific autonomic responses (11). In the cardiovascular domain, 
heart rate changes are related to amygdala and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) 
activity (12) and during stress, amygdala activity predicts systolic contractility (13). The 
amygdala, ACC and other limbic structures supply descending inputs to the hypothalamus 
and brainstem for emotion-related autonomic responses (11).  
 
1.1. The functional anatomy of interoception 
As key players in the functional anatomy of interoception, the ACC and insula cortex are 
important for the processing of interoceptive feedback and mediating autonomic responses to 
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interoceptive information (14, 15). dACC (16) and insula cortex (17, 18) activity reflects 
engagement of sympathetic nervous system activity coupled to mental and physical 
behaviours. The anterior and posterior insula show increased neuronal activity during 
respiration, isometric exercise, cold pressor and Valsalva manoeuvres (19) (20). Increases in 
blood pressure positively correlate with right dACC activity (17), supporting findings that 
sympathetic responses are lateralized to the right hemisphere (21), whereas the left insular 
cortex is involved in parasympathetic nervous system cardiovascular regulation, as evidenced 
by acute left insular stroke disrupting the correlation between heart rate and blood pressure 
(22).   
 
The insula has a posterior-to-anterior gradient, with initial sensory afferent information 
received by the posterior insula, which is then passed to the anterior insula cortex (AIC) – 
especially the right – where it is integrated with cognitive-affective biases and autobiographical 
information. This unique integrative structure has led to a variety models relating to the 
function of the region, ranging from general theories of consciousness and affect to a putative 
role as a primary viscero-sensory region (23). Accordingly, the AIC modulates homeostatic 
autonomic and interoceptive function via connections to allostatic centres (24). Reduced 
baroreceptor tone is associated with ACC, amygdala and AIC function, whereas initiation of 
baroreflexes increases activity in lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC) and posterior insula (25). The 
mid and posterior insula are associated with somatomotor function and representations (26) 
and the AIC and mid insula cortices, ACC and somatomotor cortex are functionally associated 
with shifting one’s attention to interoceptive signals (27). Bilateral insula cortices are activated 
during oesophageal stimulation (28) but as stimulation increases to the point of becoming 
painful, the right AIC is recruited (29), illustrating how increasing interoceptive feedback will 
ascend the interoceptive hierarchy from bilateral insula to right AIC, as initial reporting of 
somatic sensory feedback escalates to a violation of homeostasis then to nociception; 
engaging conscious awareness. More generally, the insula is implicated in the integration of 
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both interoceptive and exteroceptive inputs, has been proposed to act as a core comparator 
underlying the generation of a multisensory embodied self (30, 31), which also regulates 
interactions between the cognitive and affective aspects of pain (32-34). 
 
With respect to descending neural pathways, central efferent signals can drive allostatic 
changes in autonomic and behavioural function. During rest (35) and exercise (36, 37), 
perceived changes in skin temperature and thermal discomfort typically induce behavioural 
modifications before the recruitment of endocrine or autonomic thermostatic mechanisms (38, 
39). Behaviour-dependent increases in blood pressure are enabled and moderated by the 
baroreflex (40, 41) and baroreflex dysfunction causes loss of consciousness due to cerebral 
hypoperfusion. The baroreflex arc ensures cerebral perfusion by mechanoreceptors in the 
carotid arteries and aortic arch detecting changes in arterial pressure and constantly feeding 
back this interoceptive information to the nucleus of the solitary tract (NTS), which synapses 
with the rostral ventrolateral medulla to set efferent pressor tone. During emotional or cognitive 
stress, the baroreflex feedback loop is disrupted by top-down cortical influences increasing 
heart rate and blood pressure during steady-state physiological demands. Specifically, the 
aberrant cardiovascular up-regulation in the absence of allostatic demand results from 
suppression of low-order baroreceptor brainstem signalling by the solitary nucleus of the 
medulla, hippocampus, hypothalamic nuclei and prefrontal cortex (PFC) (42). In summary, 
although the central and autonomic nervous systems are defined by unique anatomical, 
functional and neurochemical characteristics, they also interact in a variety of ways to maintain 
homeostasis. Interoceptive signalling and control spans and integrates central and peripheral 
homeostatic processes, as well as influencing emotional and cognitive functions (43-45).  
 
In the following, we propose that interoception may serve as a unique window on holistic 
human nervous system function and dysfunction in disorders of brain, body and behaviour. 
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Due to the scope of this proposition, we offer a formal framework – grounded in interoceptive 
inference – that offers a methodological foundation for generating empirical predictions. To 
this end, we first formulate homeostasis in terms of interoceptive inference; via symbiotic 
interoceptive and autonomic nervous system function, before describing the clinical 
application of this approach. We then illustrate how this formulation can offer an overarching 
approach to human physiology, particularly autonomically mediated systems. Finally, we will 
review our initial empirical findings and their relationship to interoceptive inference. 
 
1.2. Interoceptive predictive coding – neural correlates for conscious and unconscious 
processes 
Discrepancies between predicted and experienced interoceptive signals have been proposed 
as a potential cause for anxiety (46). In predictive coding terms, discrepancies between ‘top-
down’ predictions generated by the brain and incoming sensory signals from the periphery are 
compared to produce a ‘prediction error’. Subsequent minimisation of this prediction error 
corresponds to a Bayes optimal estimation of how sensory signals were caused; this can be 
seen easily by noting that if descending predictions match sensations exactly, the predictions 
must have been generated by representations of the world (i.e. expectations) that are, in some 
sense, veridical. This can be formalised in terms of Bayesian inference, where the evaluation 
of an expectation about the world is based on prior beliefs and the likelihood of observed data.  
 
The application of predictive coding to perceptual inference involves minimisation of 
unpredicted or surprising sensory signals (prediction errors) within the cortical hierarchy by 
the generation of top-down predictions (figure 1). In this setting, the prediction errors at the 
sensory level play the role of a likelihood (i.e., reporting how unlikely the sensations were 
given expectations about their causes), while prediction errors at higher levels play the role of 
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empirical priors (i.e., how unlikely expectations at one level are, given expectations of the level 
above). It is fairly easy to show that minimising prediction errors at each and every level of the 
hierarchy produces a set of expectations that constitute a Bayes optimal representation of 
how sensations are generated. In brief, the minimisation of prediction errors involves 
reciprocal exchange of signals between hierarchical levels: prediction errors ascend the 
hierarchy to revise expectations, which generate descending predictions that resolve or 
suppress prediction errors at the level below. 
 
In biologically plausible versions of the scheme, prediction errors are thought to be encoded 
by the activity of superficial pyramidal neurons, which compare expectations with predictions 
descending from deep-layer pyramidal neurons in higher hierarchical levels. The prediction 
error is then projected (via intrinsic or interlaminar connections) to deep pyramidal cells 
encoding expectations in the higher cortical level, enabling a more accurate prediction to be 
reciprocated. This recurrent message passing allows prediction units to produce a more 
accurate prediction and effectively silence prediction error.  
 
Figure 1 near here 
 
A prediction error’s strength or influence on expectations or representations as higher levels 
depends on its ‘precision’ or reliability (figure 1). If a prediction error is less reliable, such as 
vision on a foggy day, more precision or weight will be afforded to prior expectations or beliefs 
about the environment. This ensures Bayes optimal perception, meaning that precision 
determines the influence of prediction error on subsequent hierarchical cortical evidence (i.e., 
prediction error) accumulation. This hierarchical form of estimation for inference necessitates 
a generative model, in which the expected cause of representations at one level of the 
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hierarchy become priors for expectations in the subordinate level. The term ‘generative model’ 
is used because the model generates the predictions of subordinate causes and ultimately 
sensations per se. When a generative (i.e. internal or forward) model is converted given the 
data at hand, sensations are explained in terms of the most likely hierarchical causes. These 
expected causes are constantly updated as new data are successively sampled to provide a 
biologically plausible form of evidence accumulation for data assimilation (47). Inversion of 
generative models refers to the deduction of the causes (hidden states of the world) from the 
consequences of sensory samples that one receives from the world. This inverts the mapping 
prescribed by the generative model that generates consequences (sensations) from causes 
(hidden or latent states). 
 
The primate brain is hierarchically structured (48), which suggests the generative model used 
by the brain must also be hierarchical. This hierarchical architecture allows for the reciprocal 
message passing of predictions and prediction errors among hierarchical levels described 
above. Predictive coding models – derived from the ‘the free-energy principle’ (FEP) (49, 50) 
– assume the brain endeavours to minimise precision weighted prediction errors throughout 
and implicitly maximise the evidence for its generative model 1 . This is known as self-
evidencing (51), which can be regarded as a generalisation of homoeostasis to every sensory 
modality predicted by the brain. Crucially, the FEP posits a defining role for homeostatic and 
allostatic processes in the functioning of the nervous system by casting the homeostatic 
imperative to stay alive as an innate and very precise prior over physiological states (30). 
 
                                                 
1 Free energy can be regarded as the total amount of (precision weighted) prediction error summed 
over all levels of a hierarchical model. 
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1.3. Active inference under the free-energy principle 
Under the free-energy principle, ‘active inference’ refers to the bilateral reduction of free-
energy when: (i) prediction errors ascend the cortical hierarchy to change predictions, or (ii) 
prediction errors descend to the periphery to engage motor (or autonomic) reflexes, which 
change sensations (52). In the sensory system, prediction errors can only be modified by 
changing predictions, whereas proprioceptive and interoceptive prediction errors can also be 
modified by engaging reflexes to alter the sensory signal at its point of origin. In short, the 
prediction error can be reduced by changing the prediction (i.e., perception) or by changing 
the sensations being predicted (i.e., action). Movements can be initiated by predictions of the 
sensory consequences of action because the motor system automatically moves the sense 
organs to meet proprioceptive predictions, thereby shifting the imperative for action from what 
the individual wants to achieve with the action to what he/she wants to experience (50). An 
intuitive example of this is the common pain reflex; if a sufficiently precise and unexpected 
stimulus is received (e.g., placing one’s hand on a hot stove), an optimal response would be 
to immediately alter sensations (e.g., by withdrawing one’s hand); rather than to update one’s 
beliefs about the stimulus. This would be the homologue of a homoeostatic reflex. The 
alternative would be to perceive the stove is too hot and turn down the gas. This would be the 
homologue of allostasis that calls on deep or hierarchical inference – driven by ascending 
prediction errors – to regain homeostasis. One can see that the two ways of minimising 
prediction error depend sensitively on the precision afforded to ascending prediction errors; 
one can either ignore ascending prediction errors via sensory attenuation to engage reflexes 
(c.f., homoeostasis) or allow ascending prediction errors to engage adaptive behaviour (c.f., 
allostasis). In this scenario, the greater the nociceptive prediction error (i.e. the more it 
deviates from homeostasis), the less it will be allowed to ascend the cortical hierarchy before 
peripheral reflexes are necessitated. In contrast, a more minor burn (a smaller prediction error) 
with less precision could ascend to higher-order processes and be integrated with more 
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complex adaptive behaviours. In what follows, we look more closely at the crucial role of 
precision in mediating between these two sorts of responses.  
 
1.4 Precision and gain control 
The precision of ascending prediction errors determines the balance between priors and 
sensory signals to govern the influence of sensory evidence and prior beliefs (figure 2). In this 
setting, attention is intimately related to precision; in that attention is thought to increase the 
precision of prediction errors so that they have a greater influence on perception. Conversely, 
sensory attenuation is thought to reduce the precision of ascending prediction errors to enable 
motor reflexes (53). In this process, a vital element of sensory attenuation requires ignoring 
the consequences of action to be ignored so that precise predictions, to allow intentions to be 
realised through the releases of reflexive action (54). In this scenario, by allowing predictions 
to be fulfilled via spinal reflex arcs, sensory attenuation allows movement to occur, meaning 
that sensory attenuation is therefore crucial for labelling movements as self-generated (55). A 
key neurobiological issue here is that precision can be associated with the excitability or 
postsynaptic gain of units encoding prediction error (56). This means that the accentuation or 
attenuation of precision rests upon neuromodulatory processes and gain control mechanisms 
mediated by short-term changes in synaptic efficacy. This is an important observation because 
it speaks to the pathophysiology of several disorders that can usually be traced back to 
neuromodulatory abnormalities (57). 
 
Figure 2 near here 
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2. Interoceptive (active) inference in theory and practice 
We now briefly describe how active inference may be transferred from the proprioceptive to 
the interoceptive domain as interoceptive inference. This will help elucidate how interoceptive 
inputs drive the autonomic nervous system to mediate homeostasis (figure 3). We begin with 
psychophysiological aspects, such as classical conditioning, the placebo effect and substance 
abuse and relapse, as well as affective disorders and psychosomatic illness. We then describe 
how interoceptive inference can offer an overarching methodology to study human physiology; 
using bladder function and thermoregulation as examples – in addition to the previously 
described cardiovascular reflex arcs. We conclude with a brief summary of our studies of 
interoceptive inference. 
  
Figure 3 near here 
 
The free-energy principle has been applied to proprioceptive and exteroceptive sensory 
domains to elucidate the neurobiology of perception, motor control and attention (58) (59), 
with applications to autism spectrum disorder (60) and schizophrenia (61, 62). However, its 
potential role in interoception has only recently been considered (4, 6, 7, 63, 64). It has been 
suggested that Pavlovian classical conditioning can be viewed an elementary form of 
interoceptive inference (65). Pavlov demonstrated not only that an unconditioned interoceptive 
prediction error (food) induces homeostatic autonomic responses (salivation) but that through 
the encoding of an exteroceptive signal (a bell), the same autonomic reflex can be induced by 
top-down predictions (66). Recently we have found preliminary empirical support of 
interoceptive inference by demonstrating that the orienting response, which was first 
described by Pavlov, is exaggerated during combined emotional aversion and the 
interoceptive threat (and therefore, increased interoceptive prediction error) of dysautonomic 
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symptom provocation in patients with the postural tachycardia syndrome and vasovagal 
syncope – two forms of dysautonomia defined by baroreflex dysfunction (67) (68). These 
findings provide insights into how interoceptive inference can prescribe autonomic reflexes 
and the destructive effect of dysautonomia on homeostasis due to the breakdown of 
autonomic reflex arcs. 
 
Pavlov also foreshadowed the role of predictive coding when noting that previously neutral 
stimuli conditioned the effects of apomorphine and morphine (69). The implication of the opiate 
system in the placebo effect (70) further suggests that interoceptive inference can explain how 
an inert stimulus can induce physiological responses via the attenuation of bottom-up 
prediction errors (71). Learning theories have underlined the role of prior expectations in the 
placebo effect, particularly placebo analgesics actual feelings of pain are overridden by the 
prediction of pain relief (72) (73) (74, 75) (76-79). Functional imaging studies have provided 
the neural correlates of the interrelated altered precision of peripheral prediction errors, 
personality, endogenous opioid system engagement and anticipatory changes that scaffold 
the effects of placebo hypoalgesia, particularly prefrontal suppression of prediction error 
processing in the ventral striatum. 
 
Recently, separate studies have started to look at the role of prediction error traits (80) (81) 
and interoception as markers for substance abuse and relapse (82). Using a within subjects 
placebo design, Gu and colleagues used a computational model of mesolimbic dopamine 
systems. found that prior beliefs about a smoked cigarette’s nicotinic content modulated 
striatum responses to reward prediction errors, evidencing how beliefs can override a potent 
neuroactive compound, such as nicotine (81).  Although these studies explored prediction 
error traits and interoception in isolation, we believe that drawing together these cornerstones 
of interoceptive inference may be useful for future work. 
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Under the active inference, anxiogenic traits, such as catastrophizing or somatic 
hypervigilance can be viewed in terms of the aberrant precision of top-down predictions or 
bottom-up prediction errors respectively. Therefore, it stands to reason that anxious 
individuals possess greater interoceptive accuracy (as measured by heartbeat tracking 
paradigms) (83, 84), on the view that these individuals assign too much precision to ascending 
interoceptive prediction errors; i.e., a failure to attenuate ascending interoceptive prediction 
errors. Cornwell and colleagues recently provided support for this by using Bayesian analyses 
to evidence how anxiogenic stimuli unbalance feedforward signalling that occurs in response 
to sensory prediction errors. Specifically, dynamic causal modelling described how anxiety-
related hypervigilant responses are best explained by the increased postsynaptic gain and 
modulation of feedforward coupling within a temporo-frontal network {Cornwell, 2017 #125}.  
 
In contrast, clinically depressed subjects have diminished interoceptive accuracy (85-87). 
Recently, reduced resting state connectivity between attentional and interoceptive networks 
has been found in melancholia (87), offering an explanation for the impoverished interoception 
and somatic ideation in these patients. These findings suggest that investigating somatic 
attention and awareness in anxiety and depression may offer targets for behavioural or 
pharmaceutical treatment strategies. In particular, an interesting clinical question is whether 
‘normalising’ interoceptive precision can affect affective symptomatology.  Furthermore, the 
focus on synaptic gain in the encoding of precision (and its attenuation) speaks to quantifying 
pathophysiology in terms of effective connectivity; specifically, the intrinsic excitability of 
neuronal sources in the interoceptive hierarchy. See (60) for an exemplar study that used 
dynamic causal modelling to look at the intrinsic excitability of the anterior insular, using an 
empathy for pain task in normal subjects and autistic spectrum disorder. 
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In hypochondriasis and somatisation disorders, patients report somatic hypervigilance and 
interoceptive sensitivity (88-91), indicating aberrant interoceptive precision. Pareés and 
colleagues (55) report loss of sensory attenuation and a related diminished sense of agency, 
which is offered as an explanation for functional movement disorder (FMD). This misattribution 
of agency – regarding voluntary movement – results in FMD patients experiencing the intent 
to move and actual movement as being simultaneous. Recently, we have applied this 
paradigm to functional syncope (fainting); i.e., apparent syncope (loss of postural tone and 
unresponsiveness) during normal blood pressure and heart rate indices that would not cause 
cerebral hypoperfusion and subsequent loss of consciousness (92). We identified two 
subgroups that experienced functional syncope during clinical autonomic assessment (93). 
The first had no undiagnosed form of dysautonomia but a prevalence (41%) of psychiatric 
illness, presenting as a typical conversion disorder group. The second had undiagnosed 
postural tachycardia syndrome during orthostatic (upright posture) manoeuvres. Neither group 
were hypotensive during functional syncopal episodes (figure 4). However, the functional 
syncope/postural tachycardia syndrome group were typically tachycardic (figure 5) during 
functional syncopal episodes, which occurred almost entirely during orthostatic stress; i.e., 
whilst symptomatic with (undiagnosed) orthostatic tachycardia. Some individuals may 
therefore be prone to impaired sensory attenuation if in a state of undiagnosed 
sympathoexcitation. One might suppose that the apparent loss of postural tone may reflect a 
failure to modulate the precision of interoceptive prediction errors during undiagnosed posture-
related tachycardia (due to baroreflex dysfunction). This provides a potential explanation for 
functional syncope in the functional syncope/postural tachycardia syndrome subgroup (94). 
 
Figure 4 and 5 near here 
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Interoceptive inference offers a new and mechanistic perspective on basic and clinical 
homeostatic issues. For example, with the context-specific knowledge that polite society 
generally prefers us to micturate in private, ascending lower urinary tract information reaches 
the brain via the PAG before relaying to the thalamus and hypothalamus, both of which send 
bladder-related interoceptive signals to the dACC, AIC and lPFC (95). If the decision is made 
not to void, then the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) inhibits the PAG. If it is decided that 
voiding should occur, the mPFC disinhibits the PAG, which activates the pontine micturition 
centre (PMC). The PMC then engages sacral autonomic efferents to relax the urethral 
sphincter and contract the detrusor (96, 97). This model provides a nice example of how 
context-specific information about the environment is inferred (from a Bayesian perspective) 
to mediate and contextualise autonomic and behavioural homeostatic outputs. Crucially, this 
rests, under interoceptive inference, on properly contextualising (i.e., predicting) the precision 
or gain of interoceptive prediction errors that underwrite homoeostatic or allostatic behaviour. 
 
Interoceptive inference proposes that interoceptive predictions and prediction errors can be 
suppressed by modifying predictions or demarcating these predictions as reference points for 
autonomically mediated reflexes (6). As with the urinary or cardiovascular systems, 
thermoregulation can be modelled within the active inference framework. Hypothermia and 
hyperthermia represent profound deviations from thermostasis; with increasingly complex 
endocrine, autonomic and behavioural homeostatic reflexes engaged as one’s core 
temperature rises or falls from its homoeostatic set point of 37C (i.e., as prediction error 
increases) (98). During this process, thermoceptive prediction errors will have greater 
precision on subsequent central signalling, as glutamatergic, cool-sensitive neurons synapse 
with GABAergic interneurons in the median preoptic area to initiate thermoregulatory 
autonomic or motor reflexes (99). Depending on whether temperature must be increased or 
decreased, the processing of thermoregulatory prediction error can also result in the inhibition 
of action potentials in warm-sensitive neurons of the medial preoptic subnucleus, which 
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mediates autonomic control of cutaneous vasoconstriction as well as motor control of 
shivering and thermogenic brown adipose tissue (BAT) (100, 101). As interoceptive inference 
dictates efferent homeostatic changes, BAT neuromodulators, such as glutamate, serotonin 
and vesicular glutamate transporter 3 will be released to control BAT sympathetic outflow and 
thermogenesis (99, 102). 
 
Under interoceptive inference, descending predictions can only elicit autonomic responses if 
the ascending prediction error has been attenuated. Without this functional change in gain, 
prediction errors would lead to revised predictions rather than action (103). We recently 
examined the relationship between measures of cardiac interoception and autonomic cardiac 
control in healthy controls and patients with forms of cardiovascular dysautonomia defined by 
baroreflex dysfunction (the postural tachycardia syndrome and vasovagal syncope) to (i) seek 
empirical support for interoceptive inference and (ii) delineate if this relationship was sensitive 
to increased interoceptive prediction error in patients during head-up tilt/symptom provocation 
(104) (105). Compared to controls, interoceptive accuracy (as measured using a heartbeat 
tracking task) was reduced in both postural tachycardia syndrome and vasovagal syncope 
groups. Healthy controls’ interoceptive sensibility (subjective confidence in interoceptive 
accuracy) positively correlated with low-and-high frequency heartrate variability (HRV) whilst 
supine (table 1). Conversely, both the postural tachycardia syndrome and vasovagal syncope 
groups’ interoceptive awareness (a metacognitive measure of the degree to which objective 
interoceptive accuracy relates to interoceptive sensibility) negatively correlated with high-
frequency HRV during head-up tilt. Our pilot study offers initial empirical evidence for 
interoceptive inference and supports our previous findings (106) that postural tachycardia 
syndrome and vasovagal syncope cohorts share a central pathophysiology underlying 
interoceptive deficits expressed across distinct cardiovascular autonomic pathophysiology. 
From a predictive coding perspective, postural tachycardia syndrome and vasovagal syncope 
patients’ data indicates a failure to attenuate/modulate ascending interoceptive prediction 
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errors, reinforced by the concomitant failure to engage autonomic reflexes during head-up tilt. 
Our findings also define how both central and autonomic processes are ultimately implicated 
in dysautonomia. 
Table1 near here 
 
Activation of the right AIC is positively correlated with interoceptive accuracy in healthy 
controls during heartbeat perception paradigms, with the right insula making inferences about 
internal bodily states, that can be accessed during conscious interoception (27). The AIC has 
2 major roles in interoceptive inference: (i) integrating top-down predictions from high-level 
cortical regions with bottom-up prediction error and (ii) cascading descending predictions that 
are a reference point for autonomic mediation of homeostasis (6, 65). This functional 
architecture accounts for the recent findings that the degree of damage to the anterior insula 
is positively correlated with acquired alexithymia levels (107), reflecting the interoceptive 
contribution to inference about emotional states (43). The AIC contains a significant number 
of ‘von Economo neurons’, which are large bipolar, spindle-shaped projection neurons (108). 
Von Economo neurons are prevalent in humans and are mainly situated in layer Vb of the 
ACC and the frontoinsular cortex (i.e., the junction of AIC and posterior orbitofrontal cortex) 
and are specifically associated with interoception (109). In comparison to controls, autism 
spectrum disorder subjects have a significantly greater ratio of von Economo neurons to 
pyramidal neurons (110), which may be of particularly relevance to the common interoceptive 
sensitivity reported in autism spectrum disorder (7, 111).  
  
The primary motor cortex (M1) is predominantly comprised of agranular neurons and issues 
motor predictions to the spinal cord to engage motor responses and reflexes (112). M1 
simultaneously sends somatosensory predictions to S1 to model the sensory consequences 
of the predicted action. The predictions propagated to S1 are efferent copies of motor 
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predictions or commands. We have found that (103, 113) S1 also attenuates sensory gain 
during self-initiated movement; thereby reducing prediction error signalling to M1, which 
receives little direct ascending sensory input. This means predictions descending via M1 to 
the spinal cord are relatively immune to correction by prediction error. This makes sense if we 
consider elementary movements are executed in a largely open loop fashion. However, S1 
generates predictions about sensory afferent signals that are probabilistic and continuously 
updated by prediction errors, and changes in the gain of S1 responses are linked to both 
predictability and attention-driven modulation of felt pain (114).  
 
The functionality of this interoceptive hierarchy can be seen in studies of oesophageal 
stimulation (28), where mild stimulation activates secondary somatosensory cortex. Then, as 
stimulus intensity escalates, interoceptive inference engages primary somatosensory, 
bilateral insula, ACC and right premotor structures. These results may reflect how escalating 
interoceptive-to-nociceptive input augments the precision of ascending prediction errors, with 
subsequent activation of the somatosensory network. If we consider the aberrant interoceptive 
precision of anxious individuals, this sort of finding may shed light on the fine detail of the 
neural correlates of irritable bowel syndrome (115); particularly in consideration of autonomic 
(e.g., postprandial) stressors that may augment interoceptive prediction errors in anxious 
subjects (116).    
 
3. Viscero-sensory integration, interoceptive self-inference and metacognitive deficits 
Reflecting the function of the most central or highest level of the interoceptive hierarchy, 
metacognitive ability for conscious introspection is frequently disrupted in a variety of 
psychopathological disorders (117). Such metacognitive failures; for example, in the case of 
addiction and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) have been linked to altered arousal (118, 
119) that is often highly specific and independent of first-order perceptual or cognitive deficits. 
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Although metacognition has traditionally been cast in terms of signal detection theory as 
depending solely on the feed-forward recollection of decision-related evidence (120, 121), 
recent advances suggest that conscious self-reflection may be better considered as a form of 
‘interoceptive self-inference’, in which hierarchically deep, supramodal predictions of expected 
precision (or representational stability) enforce interactions between subjective confidence in 
the interoceptive and exteroceptive domains. For example, we have recently shown that 
unexpected changes in autonomic arousal reverse the biasing impact of sensory noise (or 
precision) on subjective confidence, independently of decision accuracy (122). In a 
pharmacological follow-up study, we further demonstrated that noradrenaline blockade via the 
beta-adrenoceptor antagonist, propranolol, specifically improves metacognition for perception 
(123). More generally, confidence for exteroceptive judgements is linked to heart rate 
increases (122). This is consistent with the hypothesis that metacognition reflects 
interoceptive-self inference, which not only models the quality of ascending sensory inputs, 
but also their regulation by the ascending and descending visceromotor processes reviewed 
above. In this case, metacognitive beliefs are better cast as ‘experiential predictions’ (e.g., I 
expect to see an apple with high precision and I expect to ‘feel’ good about it), rather than the 
output of a strictly feedforward sensory process. This view suggests that maladaptive 
interoception may cause adjustments in metacognitive beliefs and first-order perception, 
ultimately resulting in disorders such as functional and chronic pain, social anxiety (in which 
neutral social stimuli are evaluated as threatening): see also (124). Likewise, deficits in 
perceptual ability may result in an alteration in autonomic tone, leading to maladaptive 
decision-making and systematically biased confidence. Collectively, this view motivates 
empirical investigations into the possibility of a domain-general neural mechanism linking 
interoceptive and metacognitive inference, raising the importance of measuring visceral-
sensory and cognitive deficits using both first and second-order (metacognitive) measures.  
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4 Conclusions 
A decade ago, it was proposed that interoceptive prediction errors could be a bottom-up 
source of anxiety. Predictive coding models, as assumed under the FEP, propose the brain 
must recognise the likely cause(s) of afferent sensory input at any given time to support 
adaptive responses via probabilistic (Bayesian) inference. This review provides a framework 
and supportive evidence suggesting that interoceptive inference can elucidate autonomic 
control of peripheral effector organs, cognitive-affective function, motor control, 
consciousness and dissociative symptoms. Insights into the neuroanatomy, neurochemistry, 
neurophysiology and psychophysiology of active inference, precision and precision-weighting 
are now beginning to suggest how interoceptive signals inform predictions about the state of 
the body. This review suggests that interoceptive prediction errors can not only be a bottom-
up source of anxiety but may also drive autonomic, metacognitive, motor homeostatic and 
allostatic systems. A key theme that emerges from this treatment is the role of 
neuromodulation and synaptic gain control in contextualising the use of ascending prediction 
errors for interoception and autonomic reflexes respectively – and how subtle deficits in the 
attenuation of ascending prediction errors can lead to pernicious and diverse pathology. 
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Figure 1. This schematic illustrates the message passing implicit in predictive coding based 
on the generative model described (mathematically) on the lower left. Sensory input is 
conveyed to visual cortex via ascending prediction errors from the lateral geniculate nucleus. 
Posterior expectations, encoded by the activity of deep pyramidal cells in primary visual 
cortex, are driven by ascending prediction errors while, at the same time, they are subject to 
lateral interactions – with second level prediction errors – that mediate (empirical) priors. 
These constraints are modulated by top-down predictions of their precision (blue arrows). 
These predictions are based upon expectations about precision in the highest level that are 
effectively driven by the variance or power of prediction errors at the lower level. Heuristically, 
expectations about precision release posterior expectations from constraints in the vicinity of 
an inferred object and allow them to respond more sensitively to ascending geniculate input. 
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Figure 2. This schematic details putative laminar-specific connections that are consistent with 
the precision-based predictive coding scheme in the main text. This architecture conforms 
roughly to the known neuroanatomy and physiology of canonical microcircuits and laminar 
specificity of extrinsic connections. The key aspect of this figure is the inclusion of deep 
pyramidal cells encoding the amplitude of prediction error (squared) that inform posterior 
expectations about precision in the (matrix cells) of the pulvinar. These cells reciprocate 
descending projections to modulate the gain of superficial pyramidal cells in cortex. Forward 
connections are in red and descending (backward) connections are in black. First-order 
streams are shown as full lines and second-order (precision related) streams are shown as 
broken lines. 
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Figure 3. This schematic extends the pulvinar example to provide a rough sketch of equivalent 
precision or gain control in interoceptive and proprioceptive systems. The architecture and 
anatomical designations should not be taken too seriously. However, there may be 
homologous architectures for exteroceptive, proprioception and interoception. Here, we have 
indicated this by assigning the pulvinar, basal ganglia and amygdala a common role; namely 
to provide precision control or contextual guidance to interoceptive (insular), proprioceptive 
(sensorimotor) and exteroceptive (visual) cortex respectively. In addition, each of these 
systems has been associated with a specific neuromodulator; namely noradrenaline, 
dopamine and acetylcholine in the ensuing regulation of autonomic arousal, action selection 
and attentional selection, respectively. Crucially, in a hierarchical setting, all these domain 
specific systems are integrated at the levels of the hierarchy (here attributed to the anterior 
cingulate and prefrontal cortex). Note that the recurrent or reciprocal message passing means 
that changes in the precision or postsynaptic gain in one (e.g., interoceptive) system, will 
necessarily effect processing in the others (e.g., exteroceptive). This is a necessary 
consequence of Bayes optimal inference in the sorts of hierarchical models. Note that the only 
way that this inference can act upon the world is through autonomic or motor reflexes. This 
means that exteroceptive processing has to be hierarchically integrated with proprioceptive 
and interoceptive inference – so that it can contextualise behaviour LC, locus coeruleus. VTA, 
ventral tegmental area. NBM, Nucleus Basalis of Meynert. VPL, ventral posterolateral 
thalamus. ACC, anterior cingulate cortex. PFC, prefrontal cortex. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Baseline and functional syncope episode blood pressure data in the functional 
syncope only (FS only) and functional syncope/postural tachycardia syndrome (FS/PoTS) 
cohorts 
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Figure 5. Baseline and functional syncope episode heart rate data in the functional syncope 
only (FS only) and functional syncope/postural tachycardia syndrome (FS/PoTS) cohorts 
  
34 
Interoceptive inference 
correlations 
Supine HRV Head-up tilt HRV 
Healthy controls 
Interoceptive sensibility/LF-HRV 
(rs= .816, p=.001) 
 
Interoceptive sensibility/HF-HRV 
(rs= .676, p=.002) 
 
Postural tachycardia 
syndrome 
 
Interoceptive awareness/HF-HRV 
(rs= -.457, p=.043) 
Vasovagal syncope  
Interoceptive awareness/HF-HRV 
(rs= -.658, p=.015) 
Table 1. Overview of how interoceptive inference may subjugate autonomic reflexes, as measured by 
high frequency (HF-HRV) and low frequency heart rate variability (LF-HRV). Correlations between 
cardiac interoceptive measures and autonomic cardiac control were found in healthy controls whilst 
supine and orthostatic intolerance patient groups during increased interoceptive prediction error (head-
up tilt). Interoceptive accuracy is an objective interoceptive measure gained from the subject’s 
performance during a heartbeat tracking task. Interoceptive sensibility represents subjective confidence 
in one’s own interoceptive accuracy. Interoceptive awareness is a metacognitive measure of the degree 
to which objective interoceptive accuracy relates to interoceptive sensibility 
 
